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Abstract
What impact does immigration have on neighborhood dynamics? Within metropol-
itan areas, we ￿nd that housing values have grown relatively more slowly in neighbor-
hoods of immigrant settlement. We propose three nonexclusive explanations: changes
in housing quality, reverse causality, or the hypothesis that natives ￿nd immigrant
neighbors relatively less attractive (native ￿ ight). To instrument for the actual number
of new immigrants, we deploy a geographic di⁄usion model that predicts the number
of new immigrants in a neighborhood using lagged densities of the foreign-born in sur-
rounding neighborhoods. Subject to the validity of our instruments, the evidence is
consistent with a causal interpretation of an impact from growing immigration density
to native ￿ ight and relatively slower housing price appreciation. Further evidence indi-
cates that these results may be driven more by the demand for residential segregation
based on race and education than by foreignness per se.
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ton, Queens University, Berkeley, Columbia, IESE, IZA, Bologna, Syracuse, Pittsburg/Carnegie-Mellon,
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views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily re￿ ect the views of the Federal Re-
serve Bank of Philadelphia or the Federal Reserve Bank System. This paper is available free of charge at:
www.philadelphiafed.org/econ/wps/index.html1 Introduction
What impact does immigration have on neighborhood dynamics? Do natives prefer to live
in all-native neighborhoods? As with the migration of African-Americans from the South
to the North in the ￿rst half of the 20th century, contemporary residential dynamics and
the preferences of previous settlers to live and mingle with the new migrants in the same
neighborhoods will be key to determining the outcomes of recent waves of immigrants, such
as segregation, social capital, labor market networks, pro￿ciency in the native language, and
educational achievement (Borjas, 1995).
The existing economics literature on the impact of immigration has focused on the labor
market. Recent studies (Scheve and Slaughter, 2002; Mayda, 2004) use a labor market factor-
proportions approach to predict native attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies
(Goldin, 1994) and ￿nd that native workers who are more likely to be in direct competition
with immigrants in the labor market tend to have negative views on immigration.
However, a good deal of the variance in attitudes towards immigrants remains to be ex-
plained. Some authors (O￿ Rourke, 2004; Dustman and Preston, 2000; Mayda, 2004) suggest
that a number of individuals exhibit negative attitudes toward immigration for factors other
than the labor market.
After all, immigration is not so much de￿ned by the consumption of foreign labor, which
can also be achieved by international trade, international outsourcing, o⁄-shoring, or telecom-
munications. Immigration is truly de￿ned by the physical presence of immigrants in the host
country. While some natives in cities that do not receive immigration ￿ ows may conceptually
oppose foreign trade, international outsourcing, or immigration, natives who do live in immi-
2grant areas may engage in further considerations: Are there native preferences toward living
and socially interacting with people of similar culture, language, ethnic, or socioeconomic
background?
If natives exhibit negative preferences toward interacting with immigrants, we may be
able to capture this e⁄ect through residential choices and housing market dynamics. A vast
literature has demonstrated the existence of capitalization of local public goods on housing
values (Oates, 1969) and the applicability of the hedonic model (Rosen, 1974) to estimate
the market valuation of neighborhood characteristics. Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2003),
for example, show that the demand for living close to neighbors with "better" perceived
sociodemographic characteristics has a strong impact on local housing prices. Closer to our
work, a number of papers have used housing price di⁄erentials between African and European
American neighborhoods to measure the extent of "decentralized racism" (Cutler, Glaeser,
and Vigdor, 1999).1
Previous papers (Saiz, 2003, 2007) have showed that immigration has a positive impact
on rental and house price growth in the metropolitan areas that receive immigration. This
is a quite simple consequence of a local upward sloping supply of housing and population
growth in the metropolitan areas where immigrants concentrate. However, it is not clear a
priori whether, within a metropolitan area, prices in the neighborhoods where immigrants
settle should grow at a relatively faster rate. Even if immigrants have preferences toward
1The list is too numerous for a detailed itemization: examples of this literature include Laurenti (1960),
Bailey (1966), King and Mieszkowski (1973), Berry (1975), Galster (1977), Yinger (1978), Follain and
Malpezzi (1981), and Chambers (1992). The main thrust of this literature is to distinguish between discrim-
ination against blacks in the housing markets (which implies higher housing prices in black areas) versus
"decentralized racism" where white ￿ ight is the product of white preferences for racial segregation (which
implies lower housing prices in black areas). A good discussion of these hypotheses (and of the alternative
"port of entry" explanation for higher prices in minority areas) can be found in Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor
(1999).
3living with other foreign-born individuals, this should not necessarily imply a price growth
di⁄erential as long as there are mobile marginal natives still living in immigrant areas.
However, if natives have preferences for living with other natives, or if there are preferences
for socioeconomic segregation (￿ la Benabou, 1996, Bayer, Ferreira, McMillan, 2003), then
immigration may actually be associated with a relative negative impact on housing prices.
We do ￿nd evidence that, controlling for the evolution of prices at the metropolitan area
level, increases in a neighborhood￿ s immigrant share are associated with lower housing price
appreciation. This empirical fact is consistent with the idea that natives are willing to pay
a premium for living in predominantly native areas.
It is also consistent with reverse causality: immigrants may be attracted by areas that
are becoming relatively less expensive. Therefore, we use a geographic di⁄usion model (akin
to an epidemiological contagion model) to generate predictions about the pattern of new
immigrant settlement. We use these predictions as instruments for the actual changes in
immigrant density in a neighborhood. The instrumental variables (IV) approach eliminates
the possibility that our estimates are the result of immigrants mechanically chasing locations
that are becoming less expensive. However, it is still possible that the neighborhoods that
are generally close to the previous areas of immigrant settlement have characteristics that
are becoming relatively less valuable to natives. We deal with this issue by using the het-
erogeneity in the predictive power of the geographic di⁄usion model as our e⁄ective source
of identifying variation. For instance, in metropolitan areas with bigger immigrant in￿ ows
the same level of proximity of a neighborhood to existing immigrant communities predicts a
more substantial change in the share of the foreign born. Controlling for the average prox-
imity to existing immigrant communities in the second stage of our 2SLS speci￿cations, we
4e⁄ectively compare the evolution of prices in neighborhoods that are all equally close to ar-
eas of previous immigrant settlement, but for which our model predicts di⁄erent subsequent
immigrant in￿ ows.
The evidence is consistent with a statistically signi￿cant causal impact of immigration
on home values. For instance, in an area where the share of the foreign born changes
from 0 to 30 percent, housing values can be expected to be about 6 percent lower. This
valuation re￿ ects the tastes of the marginal native, and likely represents a lower bound
for the willingness to pay for segregation of the average native. We also ￿nd that the
association between immigrant density and relative price declines at the neighborhood level
is concentrated in areas where most residents were non-Hispanic white prior to immigration
shocks. In areas dense with minorities, the association between immigration and slower
price growth is much weaker or nonexistent. Similarly, in areas where housing values were
relatively low initially, the association between immigration and slower price appreciation is
more tenuous. Therefore, immigration might actually be associated with revitalization in
poor neighborhoods or neighborhoods with high concentrations of minorities.
The results are important for understanding the social impact of immigration on desti-
nation cities and, unfortunately, seem to bode ill for the integration of immigrants. Indeed,
recent research ￿nds that immigrant segregation in the US has been on the rise during the
last three decades (Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor, 2005). The new immigrant ghetto may be
mostly due to the tendency of immigrants to spatially cluster, but the paper shows that
some natives may also have preferences for avoiding immigrant areas. Why? Our ￿nal
results shed some light on this issue. In our sample of immigrant-dense cities, the correla-
tion (at the census tract level) between the foreign-born share and the share of adults with
5less than a high-school diploma is 0.49. The correlation between decennial changes in the
share foreign born and decennial changes in the share of high-school dropouts is a notable
0.35. The association between changes in immigrant shares and the growth in the share of
minorities at the census tract level is similarly strong. The fact that neighborhoods with
growing relative concentrations of immigrants are becoming relatively less educated and less
white (two outcomes that are endogenous to the immigration in￿ ows), can explain a good
deal of the association between immigration and housing prices, since areas with less edu-
cated populations are being increasingly perceived as relatively less attractive places to live
(Glaeser and Saiz, 2004). Thus, immigrant neighborhoods may not be becoming relatively
less attractive because they are populated by the foreign born per se, but probably because
they are more likely to contain population with perceived low socioeconomic status.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we propose a conceptual
framework to understand the interaction between immigrants, natives, and residential choice.
In section 3 we discuss the data, and in section 4 the core results. Section 5 develops our
IV strategy based on a geographic di⁄usion model. In section 6 we present further results
relating to where and why immigration matters for the evolution of housing values and rents.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Economics of Immigration and the Neighborhood
We propose the simplest possible framework based on conventional racial segregation models
(Bailey, 1959; Schelling, 1971; Yinger, 1975; Courant and Yinger, 1975; Kanemoto, 1980).
The model illustrates well the main issues at play, and we make two modeling assumptions
6that are of interest: income heterogeneity in the native population and preferences for ethnic
clustering among immigrants. We assume a city with an exogenously given native popula-
tion of measure one. Among natives, income has a uniform distribution so that a measure
N of inhabitants has income equal or below ￿+N, where ￿ is the minimum income (maybe
a government transfer) and N 2 [0;1]. Immigrants tend to cluster in speci￿c city neighbor-
hoods. In the 1980s, 95 percent of the change in the number of immigrants (75 percent in the
1990s) was concentrated in a number of census tracts that corresponded to about 25% of the
1980 metropolitan US population. We therefore assume that there are four neighborhoods
and that immigrants tend to concentrate in one of them (neighborhood 4). The immigrant
neighborhood may possess ethnic-speci￿c amenities, or immigrants may just coordinate to
move there due to a, perhaps mild, preference to live with other immigrants. Nevertheless,
if natives have preferences for living with other natives, the ￿nal equilibrium in the hous-
ing market will imply clustering of immigrants even if the foreign born are indi⁄erent as
to neighborhood ethnic composition. The utility function of native i is Cobb-Douglas in






Each person consumes an identical unit of housing. Housing supply is assumed to be pro-
duced with unit elasticity, and rents in neighborhood k(Rk) have the simple functional form:
Rk = ￿ ￿ Popk (2)
7Where Popk is the total population in neighborhood k. Consumption depends on income
and rents so that Ci = ￿ + N ￿ Ri, where Ri is the rent in the location chosen by the
individual. In this simple model all houses are of the same quality and house prices are
directly proportional to rents, capitalizing their present discounted value at the discount
rate d: Pricek =
Rk
d
Without immigration, all equilibria in the residential market imply that the population
is evenly spread throughout each of the neighborhoods. If population (and thus rents) were
lower in one of the neighborhoods, everyone would like to move there. There are multiple
all-native equilibria with di⁄erent income mixes by neighborhood. With immigration, the
equilibrium in the housing market implies that the poorest natives will live in the immigrant
neighborhood, since richer individuals have a higher willingness to pay for segregation (proof
available on request). The rest of the native population will be evenly distributed in the
three other neighborhoods. In a "mixing" equilibrium there is a marginal native with income
￿+N who is indi⁄erent about whether he lives in the immigrant neighborhood or the rest
of the city:














Where F is the number of foreign-born individuals. Since all immigrants cluster in





. Under some parameters and with major immigration
in￿ ows, there may not be an equilibrium with a marginal native (i.e., the model may tip
toward total segregation). However, the income e⁄ect typically helps to achieve some mix-
ing: as the immigrant population in the immigrant neighborhood increases, the number of
8natives decreases, but the marginal native is poorer, and thus has a lower ability to pay for
segregation.2
Equation (3) implicitly de￿nes the number of natives in neighborhood 4 (N) as a function
of the number of immigrants (for some values of the parameters and the immigration in￿ ows).
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. This expression is generally negative for equilib-
ria with some ethnic mixing. To see an example of that, assume that the initial level of




















< 0, i.e. there is "native ￿ ight" out of the immigrant neighbor-
hood, if natives do not display preferences for diversity (’ ￿ 1) and there are any natives
left.3
How about relative rents/prices? If natives are indi⁄erent about the ethnic composition
of their neighborhoods (’ = 1), and without massive levels of immigration (this is with
2Since some low-income individuals do not have the ￿nancial resources to respond to their tastes for
segregation by moving to all-native neighborhoods, they may actually display stronger preferences for im-
migration limits or voice stronger opposition to immigration through their political choices, or in opinion
surveys and daily behavior.
3Although the model does not have a closed form solution, unreported simulations (available on request)
were used to generalize these "native ￿ ight" results for a number of combinations in the main parameters of
interest.
9F ￿ 1
3) we have that:
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Hence, even if immigrants exhibit a preference for clustering together in one neighbor-
hood, prices will increase in all neighborhoods equally as long as there are mobile marginal
natives in the immigrant quarters, and natives are indi⁄erent about the ethnic composition
of the neighborhood. It is therefore important to stress that in the model, within a city, and
with no preferences for segregation, we should not expect any special correlation between
immigration and prices. In fact, through a ripple e⁄ect, immigration is pushing up housing
values in all neighborhoods.
With ’ < 1 (native preferences for homogeneity), in an interior equilibrium, housing











will be associated with native ￿ ight of relatively high-income individuals, but some low-
income individuals will have an incentive to remain in the immigrant neighborhoods due to
the compensating di⁄erential of lower housing prices.4 This implies that, if one wanted to
4To see that, remember the equilibrium condition (￿ + N ￿ Rj)
’ = (￿ + N ￿ R4)
’ ￿￿
1￿’, 8j 6= 4: With
10use changes in housing values as a money metric to measure tastes for ethnic homogeneity,
the parameters obtained would correspond to the relatively low-income individuals who are
in the relevant margin. Thus, with native preferences for segregation there is a negative
relationship between the immigrant share and relative housing value growth.5 To illustrate
these e⁄ects, in Figure 1, we present the results of simulations of the model, where we assume
the parameters to be ￿ = 1, ’ = 0:9, and ￿ = 0:5. Rents (and hence prices) are growing
in both the immigrant and non-immigrant neighborhoods. However, the rate of growth is
faster in the native neighborhoods.
It is interesting to note that, once there are no natives remaining in the immigrant neigh-
borhood,6 further immigration in￿ ows into the area involve growing prices in the immigrant
ghetto and no price in￿ ation in the rest of the city. Also note that if natives actually ex-
hibit a preference for diversity (’ > 1), prices (and population) will go up in the immigrant
neighborhood: in this case some natives would actually move into the immigrant neighbor-
hood. Thus, immigration may push up housing values in a neighborhood only if there are no
marginal natives remaining, or when natives have preferences for diversity.
In all cases, immigration will push average metropolitan housing prices up. Even with
tastes for segregation, prices may increase in immigrant neighborhoods (this depends on the
parameters of the model and on immigration levels), but just not as fast as in the rest of the
metropolitan area.
(￿ < 1) then (￿ + N ￿ Rj)
’ < (￿ + N ￿ R4)
’, which implies Rj > R4.
5With a very high distaste for diversity among natives, price growth in immigrant areas might even be
negative in absolute terms despite the fact that the average city rent growth is positive.
6Absolute segregation may be very di¢ cult, since there are natives who are not mobile, who are not
marginal (for instance they value that location very highly), or native children of immigrants.
113 Data and its Methodological Implications
We use decennial data for the metropolitan areas of the United States at the census tract
level. A census tract is a small census-de￿ned geographic level which, on average, encom-
passes a population of about 4,000 inhabitants in the 1990 and 2000 censuses. The version
of the data that we use is provided by Geolytics Inc. Census tract geographic de￿nitions
change decennially. However, our data are processed so that we keep the geographic tract
de￿nitions constant over the years 1980, 1990, and 2000. Census tract and metropolitan
statistical area (MSA) boundaries correspond to their 1999 de￿nitions. Census tracts can
be interpreted as a geographical measure of neighborhoods and have been used in this sense
by previous researchers.
Several variables concerning the socioeconomic characteristics of the neighborhood are
available and will be used: housing stock characteristics (age, number of detached housing
units, number of rooms, presence of kitchen facilities, plumbing, and others), income, pop-
ulation, employment, education, age structure, ethnic composition, number of foreign-born
individuals, distributions of marital and family status, data on housing prices, ownership
rates, vacancy rates, latitude and longitude, state, metropolitan area, county, minor civil
division, and school district identi￿ers. We are also able match the census tract data to
geographic data from the United States Geological Survey (USGS) on land use by tract in
1992. Distance to central business district (CBD) is calculated by the authors using the
coordinates of the census tracts de￿ned as CBD by the 1982 Census of Retail Trade.
Due to data availability constraints we will focus on the last two decades (1980, 1990, and
2000). In areas with scant international migration in￿ ows, the location of immigrants and
12their impact may be very idiosyncratic. We therefore focus on metropolitan areas and years
for which the decennial change in the number of the foreign born amounted to 5 percent
or more of the MSA population in the previous census.7 In the 2000 census, for example,
this included some 67 metropolitan areas, which received 76.5 percent of all metropolitan
immigration in￿ ows (whereas the other 264 metro areas only accounted for 23.5 percent of
new immigrants). Overall we have 34,835 tract observations in 122 MSA-year groups.
Several limitations of the data are worth mentioning. We would have liked to have
more elaboration on the characteristics of immigrants, rather than a general variable on
the number of the foreign born. The census micro-data (IPUMS) can, and will, be used to
cross-tabulate foreign-born status with other characteristics (education, income, ethnicity,
English pro￿ciency), but unfortunately the data do not allow for the identi￿cation of the
exact neighborhood where the individuals live. Thus, the paper identi￿es the average treat-
ment e⁄ect of immigration (ATE) on the neighborhoods where immigrants locate. For 1990
and 2000, however, we have been able to create immigration counts by nationality using
published census tract cross-walks and we will infer local immigrant characteristics using
that information. Also, we cannot identify in the data those young members of immigrant
families who were born in the United States. Despite the limitations, the wealth of data
proved to be extremely useful in identifying the average impact of the foreign born on the
dynamics of neighborhoods in immigrant cities.
7The results are not sensitive to that threshold. We have performed regressions in which we censor the
sample to MSAs and decades with immigration amounting to more than 2.5% of the initial population and
the main qualitative results do not change. It is not clear whether small concentrations of immigrants in areas
where immigration is not important constitute treatments of interest if one wants to learn about the impact
of the foreign born within areas that do experience major immigration in￿ ows. Moreover, our geographic
gravity pull model is not applicable in areas that have received relatively small immigration in￿ ows.
134 Core Results
Following the discussion in section 2, we are interested in knowing whether changes in the
immigrant share are related to changes in housing prices. To do so, we follow the evolution
of average housing values in the census tracts of high-immigration metropolitan areas in the
1980s and 1990s. In Table 1, we start by regressing the inter-census (10-year) change in the
log of the average house value in a neighborhood on the change in the share of the foreign
born. Using changes in housing prices and the share of the foreign born in a neighborhood
helps us control for time-invariant omitted variables related to neighborhood quality, the
relative valuation of which stays constant across decades. The model that we estimate takes
the form:




+ ￿Zi;M;T ￿ A + Xi;M;T￿10 ￿ B + ￿i;M;T (9)
Subscripts i;M, and T are for neighborhood (census tract), MSA, and year, respectively.
Pi;M;T is the average house price in the neighborhood, ￿M;T are a group of MSA-by-year ￿xed
e⁄ects (we concentrate on the impact of immigration within a metropolitan area and year), Z
is a vector of housing stock traits, and X is a vector of initial socioeconomic characteristics of
the neighborhood. The regressions are weighted using the initial number of owner-occupied
housing units in the neighborhood as weights.8 Using the notation from the model, the main




is the change in the share of the foreign born.
Column 1 in Table 1 only controls for MSA-year ￿xed e⁄ects. A change of one percentage
8We use the initial number of renter households as weights in the regressions where the dependent variable
is the average rent in the tract.
14point in the share of immigrants in a neighborhood is associated with a relative decrease of
roughly 0.42 log points in the neighborhood￿ s average housing price. In column 2 we control
for contemporaneous changes in the observable characteristics of the housing stock. The
variables that we use are speci￿ed in Appendix Table 1. Obviously, housing prices will be a
function of the physical attributes of the housing units in a neighborhood. While changes in
observable housing characteristics may be endogenous to immigration, we want to focus on
the impact of immigration on quality-adjusted housing values. We also control for the initial
housing characteristics and other lagged socioeconomic neighborhood variables in levels.9
We do not believe in a model where lagged variables in levels have an in￿nitely durable
impact on growth rates, but the valuation of place-speci￿c characteristics has been changing
in the last part of the 20th century, and some of these initial variables are good predictors of
subsequent housing price growth (Glaeser, Kolko, and Saiz, 2002; Glaeser and Saiz, 2004).
The initial values of the socioeconomic variables should therefore capture evolving trends in
the valuation of preexisting neighborhood traits and partially capture the impact of social
trends that are unrelated to subsequent immigration levels. The coe¢ cient of the change
in the foreign born share is reduced by about 40 percent using these controls. The main
drivers of the di⁄erence between columns 1 and 2 are the changes in the observable quality
of housing. Nevertheless, most of the association remains after controls are introduced. In
column 3, we add two indicators of the environmental quality of the neighborhood: the
shares of area in the tract covered by water and devoted to industrial or commercial uses in
9We obviously do not control for changes in socio-economic characteristics of the neighborhood, since
these are endogenous to immigration. In other words, immigration clearly has an impact on housing values
because the attributes of the individuals who move into the neighborhoods (the new immigrants) are di⁄erent.
We will think of this impact as the relevant treatment e⁄ect of immigration. Later, we will discuss through
which channels the treatment e⁄ect of immigration on local prices may work.
151992.10 Results do not change much.
It is well known that housing values tend to mean-regress (Case and Shiller, 1995; Rosen-
thal, 2004). Likewise, we know that immigrants tend to locate in areas with initially low
housing values. We therefore include in column 4 the initial log of housing values to allow
for mean-reversion. More generally, this variable may capture the general evolution of prices
in neighborhoods of di⁄erent initial housing quality (which might, for instance, be a⁄ected
by widening income inequality). While we ￿nd evidence of strong mean-reversion over the
period we examine, this fact does not substantially a⁄ect our main estimate.
Are the results just driven by di⁄erential trends in the neighborhoods where immigrants
settle? For instance, immigrants may ￿nd more attractive, a⁄ordable, or available those
areas in which housing prices have been trending down. To mitigate these concerns, column
5 includes on the right-hand side home value growth in the previous decade (and column 6
also controls for the change in the log of income in the previous decade). The results of the
main variable of interest do not change much after the inclusion of these trends.
Is the impact of changes in the share foreign born nonlinear? Classical tipping models
(￿ la Schelling, 1978) suggest bigger impacts when minority concentrations are bigger. Con-
versely, if relatively minor immigration in￿ ows forecast bigger in￿ ows in the future, most of
their impact may be concentrated in the initial stages of the process of immigrant settlement.
In our data, higher-order polynomials on the change in foreign-born density are never eco-
nomically signi￿cant. This can be appreciated graphically in Figure 2, a scatter plot where
the change in the share of the foreign born appears on the horizontal axis and the change in
10The latter variable is somewhat endogenous to the evolution of land values in a tract that is residential
use (lower land values in a residential use foster shifting to alternative uses), so we may underestimate the
impact of immigration but may also capture pre-existing patterns of industrial location.
16the log of housing values on the vertical axis. Both variables are partialed out of the other
controls in Table 1, and the line displays the prediction from an OLS regression. While
the results are consistent with the approximately linear pattern of changes in prices that
we obtained through the model simulations (Figure 1), the existence of tipping equilibria in
immigrant neighborhoods is an issue that warrants more research.
In Table 2, we extend our ￿ndings in several directions. Many of the neighborhoods
where new immigrants settle were already quite distinctively immigrant-dense. Established
foreign-born residents may be better at choosing those neighborhoods that will become more
a⁄ordable in the future and new immigrants may just be following. To focus on the changes
in prices in new immigrant neighborhoods, we restrict our sample to those tracts with initial
immigrant densities below the MSA median (Table 2, column 1). The negative association
between immigrants and prices does not seem to be associated with general trends in the
older "port of entry" neighborhoods.
The regression in Table 2, column 2 uses the log of median house value rather than the
average house price. We only have median home values by census tract for 1990 and 2000,
so we restrict our attention to the 1990s. Our baseline estimates are not driven by the upper
or lower tails of the housing value distribution, since the results using median values are
remarkably close to the previous ones.
In column 3 we address potential issues concerning heterogeneity in housing supply elas-
ticities or potential idiosyncrasies in the geographic location of immigrant communities.11 In
11If the law of one price holds at the MSA level, housing prices should re￿ ect the valuation of the neighbor-
hood￿ s attributes by the marginal mover regardless of the elasticities of housing supply (to see this, assume
heterogeneous housing supply elasticities in the model in section 2). However, if the local housing market is
in disequilibrium neighborhood housing supplies might matter to explain the di⁄erential evolution of prices
in di⁄erent neighborhoods in the short run.
17Table 1 we controlled for past density (in unreported regressions, controlling for central city
location did not change the results). We go further now and divide the sample of neighbor-
hoods into quartiles de￿ned by density and distance to the central business district at T-10
within each MSA. We then run separate regressions as in table 1, column 2, within each of
the 16 possible density-distance quartile combinations. Finally, we average the individual
results using the number of tracts in each of the 16 resulting groups as weights. The results
are notably similar to the ones in previous speci￿cations. The negative relative association
between immigration and prices is found within each of these 16 very di⁄erent types of com-
munities: from dense areas close to the city center, to low-density suburban locations far
away from the metro core.
In the last column of Table 2, we include lagged immigrant density. Again, we want to
control for general trends in amenities and housing values in the areas where immigrants
tended to settle in the past. Controlling for this variable does not change the coe¢ cient of
interest. In unreported speci￿cations we also conducted separate regressions for each of the
available decades (1980s, and 1990s). The relative association of the change in the foreign
born and housing price in￿ ation was negative in both decades.
The results do show a clear negative contemporaneous correlation between changes in
housing prices and growth in immigrant density. As we will examine in more depth below,
this may mean that immigrants are attracted to areas in which prices grow less slowly
(as opposed to areas with low price levels), or that there are omitted variables that are
correlated with both international migration and house values. However, part of the negative
association may be causal. There may be tastes for socioeconomic homogeneity among
natives that account for the results.
18An alternative causal interpretation of the results implies a housing ￿ltering story, where
the housing quality desired by immigrants is lower than the quality of the existing housing
stock. In this story, immigrants (or their landlords) do not make substantial investments in
their housing units and the price of these units goes down, without any negative capitalization
e⁄ects on land values. Given the magnitude of our estimates, this story would imply a
physical depreciation of immigrant-occupied homes substantially greater than 25 percent
each decade.12 The fact that median home values change also in neighborhoods where the
median owner is a native makes this hypothesis less likely. Nevertheless, despite the fact
that we do include controls for changes in quality in our regressions, some quality attributes
may remain unobservable to us.
To address this issue, we use data from the American Housing Survey. The 2001, 2003,
and 2005 issues of the survey include information about the foreign-born status of the dif-
ferent household members in the sample. The data also contain detailed information on
housing quality and investments in renovation, maintenance, alterations, and repairs at the
household level. We run regressions where housing investment (OLS regression) and up to
17 quality indicators (logit speci￿cations) are on the left-hand side and an indicator that
takes a value of one if any of the household members is foreign born is the main explanatory
variable13 For each quality/investment attribute, we run regressions that only control for
year ￿xed e⁄ects (left columns) or for a more complete set of household attributes: income,
marital status, gender, and age of reference person, year ￿xed e⁄ects, and a dummy for
12Land values are typically high in these areas, so the structure accounts for a relatively smaller fraction
of the house value. If the impact of immigration on the total price has to come from changes in the value of
the structure, this implies a much higher depreciation rate on the physical structure.
13We obtained similar results using the foreign-born status of the reference person instead.
19recent movers (right columns). We present regressions that use the cross-sectional variation
in the pooled data from 2001, 2003, and 2005 (upper rows), and regressions that include
housing unit ￿xed e⁄ects for those observations appearing both in the 2001 and 2005 sam-
ples (bottom rows). Since we use two time observations, this ￿xed e⁄ects model is identi￿ed
from changes in the immigrant status of the homeowner.14
The results in Table 3 are notably consistent. The cross-sectional evidence shows that
immigrant homes are not of lower quality, and some of their attributes may even be better
(signi￿cant coe¢ cients at the 5% level are highlighted). In no case is a change toward immi-
grant ownership of a housing unit associated with negative changes in observable quality.
Quality is a stock variable and may evolve very slowly. But the total expenditure on
maintenance and renovation is a ￿ ow variable that is under direct control of the household.
The evidence does not support the view that immigrant homeowners may depreciate faster
their housing assets faster by investing less in maintenance and renovation either.
5 A Gravity Model of Immigrant Residential Choice
It is not too complicated to think of two reasons why immigration in￿ ows may be endogenous
to the contemporaneous evolution of housing prices. One is reverse causation. Immigrants
may be looking for a⁄ordable housing and avoid those areas where home values are growing
faster than the MSA￿ s average. In this case, the association between immigrant in￿ ows and
relative price in￿ ation is negative, but for causes other than international migration itself.
14Changes in quality and immigrant status of the homeowner between two consecutive sample years are
too noisy to be reliably used, and therefore we do not include the 2003 observations, relying rather on the
"long-di⁄erences" in the variables.
20The second reason why changes in the share of the foreign born may not be exogenous to the
error term is omitted variables. Moving costs are sunk for newly arriving immigrants. They
are, initially, very mobile. Immigrants may tend to select the best new locations in the city:
those locations that are experiencing improvements in public goods or amenities, or nicer,
high-quality new housing developments. Or, they might be attracted to neighborhoods with
improving job prospects. That would lead to an overestimate of the association between the
growth in the foreign-born population and price in￿ ation. Alternatively, omitted variables,
such as the changing valuation of neighborhood characteristics that are correlated with
immigration, could bias the relevant coe¢ cient downward.
To deal with reverse causation and omitted variables, we would optimally like to observe
exogenous immigration shocks into a group of neighborhoods and analyze the subsequent
evolution of housing values. We devise an instrumental variable strategy that tries to emulate
that ideal experiment. Immigrants tend to cluster in proximity to where other immigrants
live, which is a very well-documented fact both in sociology and economics (Borjas, 1992,
1995; Moebius, 2002). There are many reasons for immigrant clustering, most of them having
to do with the advantages of proximity to people in the same national, ethnic, linguistic, or
socioeconomic group (such as sharing information and the use of common local public goods).
We take advantage of this immigrant clustering to partially predict the patterns of new
immigrant settlement in US metropolitan areas. Again, we limit ourselves to metropolitan
areas with major immigration in￿ ows.15 In our model, all-native neighborhoods that are
geographically close to existing immigrant enclaves have a higher probability of becoming
15If there are no new immigration in￿ ows, reversion to the mean is expected: immigrant clustering would
be decreasing every year and predicting the change in the immigrant share by neighborhood would be a
dubious exercise.
21immigrant areas in the future. We start by de￿ning a variable that proxies for the appeal of











Pulli;T is our estimate of the immigrant "geographic gravity pull" of a neighborhood i




is the share of immi-
grants in neighborhood j in the previous census (ten years ago), Areaj is the area (square
miles) of the corresponding jth census tract, and dij is the distance between neighborhoods i
and j. Our measure of "gravity" is a weighted average of lagged immigrant densities in neigh-
boring communities, where the weights are directly proportional to the area of neighboring
tracts and inversely proportional to their distance from the relevant neighborhood.
The intuition for this geographic di⁄usion approach can be easily grasped by looking
at Figure 3. The grids in the ￿gure represent census tracts in a metropolitan area. Immi-
grant density is signi￿ed by a darker color. At time T-10, census tract A is surrounded by
immigrant-dense neighborhoods. Tract B is further from the areas of immigrant settlement,
and C is further yet. At time T (after 10 years), and assuming that the city is receiving
further immigrant in￿ ows and that immigrants keep clustering, we would expect tract A to
receive a higher immigrant intake.
An important parameter in our gravity model is the coe¢ cient of spatial decay, ￿. We
do not have strong priors on the exact magnitude of this parameter and so we let the data
convey that information. In general, however, we expect ￿ not to be too close to zero,
since we believe that distance from established immigrant communities does deter somewhat
22immigrant in￿ ows. Conversely, ￿ cannot be too big, since we expect immigrants to value
general access to a portfolio of neighboring communities and not to focus exclusively on one
point in space. In practical terms, we measure the distance between two census tracts as
the Euclidean distance in a longitude-latitude degree two-dimensional plane. In order to
choose the parameter ￿, we simulate di⁄erent patterns of lagged spatial correlation in the




= AM + ￿ ￿ Pulli;2000;M + "i;2000;M (11)
M is a subscript for metropolitan areas and A is a metro area ￿xed e⁄ect. We are
searching for the parameter ￿ that maximizes R-squared in equation (12). The results from
this exercise can be appreciated in Figure 4. There is a clearly concave relationship between
￿ and the ￿t of our lagged spatial correlation model. The maximum predictive power of the
model is obtained for a spatial decay parameter close to 1.6, which is the number that we
settle for.16
How well can we predict changes in immigration density using our geographic gravity
pull variable? The answer is that Pulli;T is an excellent instrument, but there is a lot of
variation left to explain outside of the gravity model. This can be seen graphically in Figure
5. The ￿gure shows a scatter plot with the calculated Pulli;T (partialed out of MSA-year
￿xed e⁄ects) on the horizontal axis and the change in the share of the foreign born in each
tract (similarly partialed out of MSA and year in￿ uences) on the vertical axis. The line of
16The results in the paper would not change much if we set beta to be equal to 2, the classical Newtonian
gravity parameter.
23best ￿t (OLS prediction) has a signi￿cantly positive slope. However, much variation in the
changes in immigrant density remains to be explained.
In Table 4, we present the results of a regression where we use Pulli;T directly as an
instrument for the change in the immigrant share in a neighborhood. Appendix Table 2
shows the ￿rst stages of all 2SLS regressions. Neighborhoods that were located close to
previous centers of foreign born settlement attracted new immigrants subsequently. The
F-test for the excluded exogenous variable is 76.01. The results in Table 4, column 1, still
point to a strongly negative impact of immigration on the relative evolution of prices within
a city. Columns 2 and 3 add the share of immigrants in the neighborhood at T-10 and other
control variables to obtain similar, albeit more imprecise, estimates. Note the loss in the
power of the instrument in the ￿rst stage in column 3 due to the strong correlation between
Pulli;T and past immigrant density. We can think of the IV strategy now as the capturing
the variation in Pulli;T that is orthogonal to past immigrant density.
A potential caveat of the instrument hinges on the exogeneity assumption of Pulli;T with
respect to the subsequent evolution of prices. It is certainly possible that previous immi-
grants were attracted to neighborhoods with characteristics that are becoming relatively less
valuable to natives, and which are also spatially correlated. An additional, very related, con-
cern hinges on the possibility that proximity to immigrant neighborhoods may be associated
with increasing negative externalities that spill over.
We deal with these issues by using the heterogeneity in the predictive power of the
geographic di⁄usion model as our e⁄ective source of identifying variation. Pulli;T may be
a worse predictor of future growing immigration in neighborhoods that are already heavily
immigrant. For example, if 100 percent of the population in a tract is already composed of
24immigrants, proximity to other foreign-born areas will not be predictive of increases in its
immigrant density. We model the fact that geographic di⁄usion of immigration is more likely
to go from more immigrant-dense neighborhood to less immigrant-dense neighborhoods by
interacting Pulli;T with the lagged share of the foreign born. The intuition behind this
strategy can be seen in Figure 6. Tracts A and B are exposed to a similar geographic
immigrant pull in period T-10. However, we might expect immigration density to grow
faster in tract B, since tract A is already more immigrant dense, and B is further from its
steady-state equilibrium.
We use the general MSA level of immigration similarly. If there is no new immigration
into the city, we would not expect the "gravity pull" of a neighborhood to be a particularly
good predictor of future changes in the immigrant share. Therefore, the interaction between
Pulli;T and the relative magnitude of immigration by metropolitan area is likely to improve
the predictive power of the geographic di⁄usion model.17 This research design can be grasped
from Figure 7. At time T-10, tract A1 (in city 1) and tract A2 (in city 2) are identical in
terms of proximity to immigrant neighborhoods. But since new immigration is greater in
city 1, we can expect our geographic di⁄usion model to predict more immigration in A1 than
in A2.
Using the interactions of Pulli;T with the initial share of the foreign born and immigration
per capita in the MSA, we can control for the "gravity pull" of a neighborhood on the right-
hand side in the second stage of our 2SLS speci￿cation. The identi￿cation now comes from
comparing two census tracts with the exact same estimated "gravity pull" but with di⁄erent
17We divide the number of new immigrants in an MSA by its initial population to obtain the relative size
of immigration.
25initial immigrant densities or with di⁄erent immigration shocks at the MSA level. While
neighborhood dynamics, unobserved characteristics, and externalities should be similar in
these neighborhoods, the expected growth rate of their foreign-born share is di⁄erent.
In column 5, we still ￿nd a signi￿cantly negative, albeit smaller, impact of immigration in
otherwise similar communities, and the precision of our estimates increases (F-tests suggest
very strong instruments, Hansen overidenti￿cation tests fail to reject exogeneity). The latter
results suggest that reverse causation or neighborhood characteristics could account for up to
15 percent of the negative impact of immigration on changes in values in the regressions with
controls, and up to 50 percent of the raw correlation. The rest seems to be causal.18 In order
to obtain a sense for orders of magnitude, assume that a neighborhood goes from having no
immigrants to having a foreign-born density equivalent to 30 percent of the population. The
results in Table 5, columns 4 and 5, suggest that housing prices will grow about 6 percent
more slowly in these areas over a period of ten years.19
6 Further Results
6.1 Native mobility and white ￿ ight
It is interesting to map changes in immigrant concentration to changes in native population.
Trivially, the growth in the share of the foreign born implies a commensurate negative change
18Another potential concern is that the Pulli;T variable may be correlated with changes in the immigrant
density of neighboring communities and that there are spillovers across neighborhoods. Controlling for
(Pulli;T+10 ￿Pulli;T) on the right-hand side does not change the results (note that Pulli;T+10 is actually a
contemporaneous measure of spatial distance to immigrants).
19In Appendix Table 3 we reproduce some of the results in Table 4, but this time, using ￿Pulli;T or
nonlinearities in the initial immigrant density as instruments for the change in the foreign-born density. The
results are not too dissimilar from the ones in the OLS regressions.
26in the share of natives. In order to learn about this issue, therefore, we consider the change
in the number of immigrants, natives, and non-Hispanic whites, divided by the original tract
population as the relevant measures of local demographic change.
In Table 5, columns 1 and 3, not surprisingly, we ￿nd that in areas with more immigrants,
the native and white populations also grew. This is not surprising because immigration is
endogenous: we can expect growing areas to attract a growing share of the city￿ s population
(native and immigrant alike). In fact, depending on the initial shares of the foreign born, it
is possible that some of these areas are becoming relatively less immigrant dense.
A more interesting exercise is to use our most demanding IV strategy (as in Table 4,
column 5) to asses the impact of exogenous immigration shocks. Remarkably, these are
associated with absolute decreases in the level of native population. Such "native ￿ ight"
can be entirely accounted for by a shrinking non-Hispanic white population in these areas.20
The di⁄erence between columns (4) and (2) is quite consistent with the fact that the average
immigrant family has about 0.45 native children per immigrant, and with the fact that in
the areas where the instrument has most of its "bite" (neighborhoods with high immigrant
concentrations) immigrants tend to be minorities (mostly Hispanic and Asian).
6.2 Heterogeneous treatment e⁄ects
In Table 6, we speculate about the possibility that the treatment e⁄ect of immigration is dif-
ferent in di⁄erent types of neighborhoods. Concretely, we interact the change in immigrant
density with the initial values of two variables: the share of non-Hispanic white population
20Note that, unfortunately, we do not have cross-tabulations of immigrant and non-Hispanic White status
at the census tract level.
27and the within-MSA quartile of housing values at T-10 (the relevant variable takes value
zero for the ￿rst quartile, and 1, 2, and 3 for the subsequent quartiles). The regressions
(columns 1 to 3) control for all the other relevant variables in our baseline speci￿cation.21
The results show that the association between growing immigrant density and slower housing
price appreciation is much more relevant in those neighborhoods where the population was
predominantly white in the initial period. Similarly, the impact of immigration seems to
be stronger in neighborhoods that were initially more expensive. These results are sugges-
tive of heterogeneous treatment e⁄ects, and are consistent with the existence of residential
preferences based on race and income.
6.3 Rents
In Table 7 we show how the negative association between immigration and housing prices
also holds for rents. We limit our sample to those metropolitan areas without rent control
regulations. The general associations with rents (columns 1 and 2) are weaker. However,
their magnitude can be explained by the fact that rental units tend to be in areas denser
with minority households and with low housing quality. The interacted models posited in
the previous section, this time using data on rents (columns 3, 4, and 5), yield estimates
that are surprisingly close to those in Table 6.
21We do, however, substitute the log of lagged income by the log of lagged housing values when using the
interaction between immigration and housing value quartiles. The correlation between the log of incomes
and the log of values is 0.9, so the two variables play a similar role as controls, and cannot be used together
due to multicollinearity problems.
286.4 "Unbundling" immigration
In Tables 1, 2, and 3 we have determined that no more than 0.18 log points of the initial
association (0.42) between changes in immigrant density and price depreciation can be ex-
plained by changes in the quality of the housing stock and predictable neighborhood trends.
Our IV strategies do not provide an exact point estimate. Notwithstanding this fact, we can
conservatively use the estimates in Table 4 (columns 4 and 5) to conclude that up to an extra
0.03 log points may be accounted by omitted variables and reverse causation. But then, what
does account for the remaining causal impact (49 percent of the initial raw association)?
In Figure 8, we carefully lay out the likely avenues through which immigration may
be associated with changes in local neighborhood housing values. We think the ￿gure to be
extremely illustrative of the issues surrounding our empirical approach, hence we recommend
that the reader study it carefully.
First, as in our model, natives may have preferences for living with other natives. Second
and third, natives may have preferences for living with individuals of the same racial or
ethnic group, or with individuals of higher socioeconomic status. This latter preference is
consistent with models based on local human capital externalities (Benabou, 1993) and with
empirical evidence of segregation by income in the United States (Davido⁄, 2004). In fact,
income segregation was higher in 2000 than in 1970 in the US metropolitan areas (Watson,
2003). Under these two scenarios, the model discussed earlier in the paper is still applicable,
but now, rather than foreignness per se, the salient characteristics that determines residential
segregation are race or socioeconomic status. Finally, another possibility is that the quality
of schools worsens in the areas where immigrants concentrate or that parents perceive this
29to be the case. For instance, if schools have to divert more resources toward English as a
second language programs, that may detract from the resources devoted to other educational
programs.
In Table 8 we provide evidence against the ￿rst hypothesis based on simple nativist
preferences. If natives simply want to avoid living with foreigners, the association between
immigration and prices should be similar for all immigrant groups in the US. Using the 1990-
2000 census tract cross-walk we are able to produce estimates of immigrants by national
group by tract (as de￿ned in the 2000 census) for 1990 and 2000.22 We then merge data on
the nationalities with a relatively small number of migrants into broader regional groups.
Column 1 shows regressions where we control for the changes in the di⁄erent immigrant
shares by nationality. The association between changes in the share of Europeans, South
Asians (from the Indian subcontinent), and Cubans and changes in housing prices is not
statistically or economically di⁄erent from zero. There is a fair amount of heterogeneity by
national origin. These results do not seem consistent with a model of generalized, untargeted
nativism.
Can broad trends in school quality or ￿nances (as in Fernandez and Rogerson, 1996)
explain our results? If the quality of education was very important to explain our results, we
would expect the association of immigrant density with prices to be stronger between school
districts rather than within school districts. In column 2, we show the results of a regression
22We assign 1990 immigrants to 2000 tracts using the share of the population in 1990 that was contained
within the 2000 tract boundary. This, inevitably, generates measurement error because immigrants needn￿ t
be distributed within the tract as the rest of the population. Since we also have the actual number of total
immigrants in each 2000-de￿ned tract in 1990, we use only observations where our imputation of the number
of immigrants in 1990 is within 10% of the actual number (83% of the cases). The correlation between our
imputed change in the total share of the foreign-born between 1990 and 2000 and its actual change is 0.99
in this subsample.
30that includes school district-by-year ￿xed e⁄ects, which are similar to the earlier estimates.
However, the existence of private school alternatives and the fact that we do not have school
attendance boundaries do not allows us to completely rule out a school-based explanation.
More research on this issue is granted.
In column 3, we explore the other avenues through which we hypothesize immigration to
impact neighborhood dynamics: ethnicity and socioeconomic status (SES). We do know that
immigrant neighborhoods contain a higher share of less-educated and minority individuals.
For instance, a simple regression with the share of high-school dropouts on the left-hand
side and the share of the foreign born on the right-hand side yields an estimated elasticity
of 0.65 (the t-statistic is 126). Unfortunately, the available data do not tabulate immigrant
status with any of the SES of interest, and does not allow us to separate the impact of
di⁄erent types of immigrants directly.23 But we can make use of the data on immigration by
nationality to infer the immigration-driven "shock" to local SES characteristics. Using 1990
and 2000 microdata from the census (IPUMS) we calculate the average share of high-school
dropouts and racial characteristics by immigrant national group and state of residence. We
focus on these variables because other interesting immigrant SES attributes (income, or the
ability to speak English well, for example) where found to be extremely collinear to, and
therefore well explained by, these two main "factors" across national groups. We then proxy
the immigrant-driven shock to these characteristics at the tract level using the shares by
nationality. This is summarized in the equation: S(X)iR =
P
8C
￿fiC ￿ XCR; the supply shock
23We cannot, alternatively, include the contemporaneous change in the share of uneducated individuals,
or change in the minority share in the neighborhood as controls besides the change in the immigration share.
These variables are clearly a⁄ected by the treatment. Immigrants embody traits such as education and
ethnicity. Major immigrant in￿ ows change the average characteristics of a neighborhood directly, and also
indirectly, as such in￿ ows are associated with additional sorting of households between neighborhoods.
31S to attribute X, in census tract i, located in State R, is proxied by the sum of the changes in
the shares of the foreign born f by country group C in the tract, multiplied by the average
attributes by country-group and state. In Appendix Table 4 we summarize some of the
relevant characteristics by country.
Introducing variables that capture the immigrant-driven supply shock to the local share of
individuals who are high-school dropouts, and four racial/ethnic group shares (non-Hispanic
White, Black, Asian, Hispanic), we ￿nd evidence that both education and race seem to
matter (we also control for school district ￿xed-e⁄ects, in order to "unbundle" the three
channels outlined in Figure 8). The negative association between immigration and changes
in prices is stronger in neighborhoods where new immigrants are less educated and tend to
be minorities. The coe¢ cient on the Hispanic immigrant-driven shock is not signi￿cant, but
this and the education variables are highly multicollinear (correlation of 0.91), and we cannot
reject an impact statistically equivalent to that of the Asian variable. Although tentative,
the results here suggest that the local interplay between immigrants and the cultural, racial,
and SES preferences of natives should become a central topic for the economics research on
the local impact of international migration.
7 Conclusions
Are immigrant neighborhoods attractive to natives? While previous research (Saiz, 2003,
2007) shows that metropolitan areas with major immigration in￿ ows have tended to expe-
rience faster housing price in￿ ation on average, we do not know much about the impact of
immigration on local housing markets. In a theoretical model with perfect mobility, immi-
32gration need not have a positive impact on the relative housing prices of the neighborhoods
where immigrants concentrate. However, if immigrant enclaves are perceived as less desir-
able places to live by natives, then we should expect a relative negative association between
immigration density and housing prices.
Empirically, we ￿nd that, controlling for MSA-by-year ￿xed-e⁄ects, housing values grow
relatively more slowly in neighborhoods with increasing immigrant density. This empirical
fact is, indeed, consistent with the idea that natives are willing to pay a premium for living
in predominantly native areas. It is also consistent with reverse causality: immigrants may
be attracted to areas that are becoming relatively less expensive. Therefore, we used a geo-
graphic di⁄usion model (akin to an epidemiological contagion model) to generate predictions
about the pattern of new immigrant settlement. We used these predictions as instruments
for the actual changes in immigrant density in a neighborhood. Subject to the validity of
our instruments, the evidence is consistent with a causal interpretation from growing immi-
grant density to "native ￿ ight" and relatively slower housing price appreciation. The causal
impact is estimated to be 50 percent smaller than the raw association between changes in
prices and immigrant density. Further results indicate that the negative association between
immigration and local price growth may be driven more by the fact that immigrants tend
to be of low socioeconomic status and to belong to minority groups, than by "foreignness"
per se.
As with the African-American South-North migration of the ￿rst half of the 20th century,
contemporary residential dynamics and the preferences of previous settlers to live with the
new migrants in the same neighborhoods will be key to determining the future socioeconomic
outcomes of the recent waves of immigrants. Given the growing demographic importance of
33immigration in the US, the results of the paper suggest that the disappearance of the new
immigrant ghetto will be painfully slow.
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Changes in Quality of 
Education 
Reverse Causality 
Changing Quality of the 
Housing Stock (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆(Foreign Born/Population) -0.418 -0.246 -0.25 -0.264 -0.252 -0.244
(0.016)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)***
Share with Bachelor's Degree at T-10 0.101 0.095 0.183 0.188 0.196
(0.012)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)***
Log Family Income at T-10 -0.005 -0.004 0.121 0.112 0.082
-0.007 -0.007 (0.009)*** (0.010)*** (0.011)***
Share Non-Hispanic White at T-10 0.002 -0.003 0.015 0.013 0.013
-0.005 -0.005 (0.005)*** (0.005)** (0.005)***
Share 24 or younger at T-10 -0.104 -0.107 -0.226 -0.226 -0.23
(0.027)*** (0.028)*** (0.029)*** (0.030)*** (0.030)***
Share 65 or older at T-10 -0.066 -0.075 -0.07 -0.09 -0.09
(0.021)*** (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.023)*** (0.023)***
Share Households Familiy+Kids at T-10 0.051 0.044 0.09 0.088 0.08
(0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)***
Ownership Rate at T-10 (Households) -0.069 -0.065 -0.105 -0.105 -0.105
(0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)***
Vacancy Rate at T-10 0.04 0.035 0.068 0.047 0.042
(0.022)* -0.022 (0.023)*** (0.025)* (0.025)*
Log Density at T-10 -0.013 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.013
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Share Water Land Cover (1992) 0.057 0.078 0.072 0.069
(0.016)*** (0.017)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)***
Share Commercial, Industrial, Mining Land Cover (1992) -0.037 -0.041 -0.04 -0.042
(0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)***
Log Average House Value at T-10 -0.166 -0.155 -0.147
(0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)***
Change in Log Value at T-10 -0.01 -0.021
(0.004)** (0.005)***
Change in Log Family Income at T-10 0.062
(0.008)***
MSA-Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Change in Housing Quality no yes yes yes yes yes
Housing Quality at T-10 no yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 34,833 34,833 34,492 34,492 30,948 30,947
R-squared 0.79 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.86
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
∆Log Average Value
TABLE 1
Changes in the Foreign-Born Share and Neighborhood Valuation
The table shows regressions where the change in the log of average housing prices between consecutive decennial censuses by
census tract is the left-hand-side variable. The explanatory variable of interest is the change in the share of the foreign-born by
tract between consecutive census years. All regressions include fixed effects for each Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and
year combination. The regressions include observations from all census tracts in major immigrant cities, as defined in the text, for











(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆(Foreign Born/Population) -0.276 -0.278 -0.221 -0.245
(0.027)*** (0.057)*** (0.021)*** (0.015)***
(Foreign Born/Population) at T-10 -0.028
(0.012)**
MSA-Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes
Change in Housing Quality yes yes yes yes
Housing Quality at T-10 yes yes yes yes
Other variables in Table 1, Column 2 yes yes yes yes
Observations 17,364 21,681 34,833 34,833
R-squared 0.85 0.39 - 0.85
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The table shows regressions where the change in the log of average (columns 1,3, and 4) or median (column 2)
housing prices between consecutive decennial censuses by census tract is the left-hand-side variable. The
explanatory variable of interest is the change in the share of the foreign-born by tract between consecutive census
years. All regressions include fixed effects for each Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and year combination. The
regressions include observations from all census tracts in major immigrant cities, as defined in the text, for the
1980-1990, and 1990-2000 periods. The average tract housing quality attributes are itemized in Appendix Table 1.
TABLE 2
Further ResultsForeign-Born Dummy (OLS/logit) 70.032 2.458 -0.079 -0.048 -0.119 -0.025 -0.572 -0.523 -0.092 -0.166 -0.066 -0.058
(52.541) (69.883) (0.068) (0.080) (0.100) (0.114) (0.069)*** (0.080)*** (0.117) (0.144) (0.036)* (0.043)
Foreign-Born Dummy (Logit FE) 210.02 123.355 -0.214 -0.162 0.618 0.635 -0.137 -0.147 -0.395 -0.381 -0.283 -0.27
(259.796) (259.423) (0.221) (0.227) (0.396) (0.413) (0.237) (0.241) (0.389) (0.404) (0.140)** (0.142)*
Foreign-Born Dummy (Logit) 1.298 1.374 -0.136 -0.189 -0.242 -0.235 0.011 -0.028 0.08 0.117 -0.083 -0.02
(0.049)*** (0.059)*** (0.073)* (0.088)** (0.086)*** (0.105)** (0.097) (0.117) (0.064) (0.074) (0.083) (0.097)
Foreign-Born Dummy (Logit FE) 0.247 0.279 -0.534 -0.553 0.07 0.097 -0.071 0.009 0.245 0.278 0.051 0.078
(0.268) (0.280) (0.325) (0.346) (0.339) (0.347) (0.401) (0.416) (0.236) (0.239) (0.299) (0.304)
Foreign-Born Dummy (Logit) -0.183 -0.22 -0.29 -0.251 -0.497 -0.475 0.14 0.16 -0.168 -0.149 -0.041 -0.018
(0.091)** (0.108)** (0.125)** (0.146)* (0.034)*** (0.041)*** (0.028)*** (0.035)*** (0.150) (0.176) (0.057) (0.066)
Foreign-Born Dummy (Logit FE) -0.34 -0.33 0.659 0.878 0.064 0.062 -0.013 0.011 0.448 0.346 -0.078 -0.102
(0.377) (0.389) (0.512) (0.563) (0.124) (0.125) (0.180) (0.183) (0.571) (0.591) (0.217) (0.219)
Other Controls no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
TABLE 3
The table displays the coefficient on a foreign-born dummy variable in separate regressions where a number of quality indexes are in the left-hand side. The foreign-born dummy takes value one if
at least one member in the household is foreign born. The coefficients correspond to the parameter estimates in logit specifications, except in the case of renovation costs (OLS). The coefficients in
the left of each set of regressions correspond to specifications where the only controls are the foreign-born dummy and year fixed effects. The coefficients in the right of each set of regressions
correspond to specifications where we control for income, marital status, gender and age of reference person, year fixed effects, and a dummy for recent movers. The Logit and OLS regressions
include data from the 2001, 2003, and 2005 waves of the AHS (upper rows). The fixed effect Logit specifications (bottom rows) consider only the subset of housing units that appear in both the
2001 and 2005 samples, and include housing unit fixed effects.
Neighborhood has bad 
smells




Immigrants and Housing Quality/Investments (AHS: 2001-2005)
At least one room 
lacking electrical plugs
Windows covered with 
metal bars
Windows broken Holes/cracks or 
crumbling in 
foundation
Roof has holes Roof missing 
shingles/other roofing 
materials
Total renovation costs Open cracks wider 
than a dime
Large peeling paint 
areas 
Water leak in 
basement




Evidence of rodents Garage or carport with 
unit(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆(Foreign-Born/Population) -0.346 -0.323 -0.181 -0.211 -0.214
(0.082)*** (0.136)** (0.150) (0.050)*** (0.054)***





Other variables in Table 1, Column 2 no yes yes yes yes
MSA-Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes
Instruments Gravity Pull Gravity Pull Gravity Pull
Gravity Pull, 
Gravity Pull • MSA 
Immigration, 




Gravity Pull • MSA 
Immigration, 
Gravity Pull • 
Share Foreign 
Born at T-10
F-test of excluded variables 76.01 30.9 22.12 365.09 339.87
Hansen Overidentification Test (p-values) 0.95 0.80
N 34,833 34,833 34,833 34,833 34,833
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
+ As defined in text and divided by 1,000,0000
TABLE 4
Geographic Gravity Pull Instrument
∆Log Average Value
The table shows regressions where the change in the log of average housing prices between consecutive decennial
censuses by census tract is the left-hand-side variable. The explanatory variable of interest is the change in the share of
the foreign born by tract between consecutive census years. This variable is instrumented with the immigrant "gravity pull"
variable (columns 1, 2, and 3), and interactions of the latter variable with initial levels of immigrant density in the tract and
the level of immigration in the last decade by Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) relative to the initial MSA population
(columns 4 and 5). "Gravity pull" is defined - for each census tract - as a weighted average of immigrant densities in
neighbouring census tracts at T-10, where the weights are directly proportional to the area of the neighboruing tract and
inversely porportional to the distance between the tracts. All regressions include fixed effects for each MSA and year
combination. The regressions include observations from all census tracts in major immigrant cities, as defined in the text,
for the 1980-1990, and 1990-2000 periods. (1) (2) (3) (4)
(∆Foreign Born)/Population at T-10 1.244 -0.137 0.772 -0.675
(0.108)*** (0.043)*** (0.105)*** (0.045)***
Other variables in Table 5, Column 5 yes yes yes yes
Instruments None
Gravity Pull, 
Gravity Pull • 
MSA 
Immigration, 





Gravity Pull • 
MSA 
Immigration, 
Gravity Pull • 
Share Foreign 
Born at T-10
N 36,847 36,847 36,847 36,847
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
+ As defined in text and divided by 1,000,0000
The table shows regressions where the change of population in especific nativity/ethnicity groups between
consecutive decennial censuses by census tract divided by its initial population is the left-hand-side variable.
The explanatory variable of interest is the change in the number of the foreign born by tract divided by its initial
population. In columns 2 and 4, this variable is instrumented with the immigrant "gravity pull" variable and
interactions of the latter variable with initial levels of immigrant density in the tract and the level of immigration in
the last decade by Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) relative to the initial MSA population. "Gravity pull" is
defined as in Table 3. All regressions include fixed effects for each MSA and year combination. The regressions





Population)/ (Population at T-
10)
TABLE 5
Immigrant Inflows and Native Mobility (Within MSA)Where does the value-immigration link matter?
(1) (2) (3)
∆(Foreign Born/Population) -0.066 -0.161 -0.062
(0.034)** (0.019)*** (0.033)*
∆(Foreign Population/Population) • 
Share Non-Hispanic White at T-10 -0.285 -0.193
(0.050)*** (0.054)***
∆(Foreign Population/Population) • 
House Value Quartile at T-10 -0.075 -0.057
(0.013)*** (0.014)***
MSA-Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes
Change in Housing Quality yes yes yes
Housing Quality at T-10 yes yes yes
Other variables in Table 1 yes yes╨ yes╨
Observations 34,833 34,835 34,835
R-squared 0.85 0.85 0.85
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
∆Log Value
TABLE 6
╨ In equations 2 and 3, we substitute log of income at T-10 by log of housing values
at T-10. The correlation between these variables is 0.9
The table shows regressions where the change in the log of average housing prices
between consecutive decennial censuses by census tract is the left-hand-side
variable. The explanatory variable of interest is the change in the share of the foreign
born by tract between consecutive census years. All regressions include fixed effects
for each Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and year combination. The regressions
include observations from all census tracts in major immigrant cities, as defined in the
text, for the 1980-1990, and 1990-2000 periods.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆(Foreign Born/Population) -0.284 -0.079 0.035 -0.011 0.042
(0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
∆(Foreign Population/Population) • 
Share Non-Hispanic white at T-10 -0.196 -0.102
(0.059)*** (0.062)*
∆(Foreign Population/Population) • 
House Value Quartile at T-10 -0.058 -0.051
(0.013)*** (0.014)***
MSA-Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes
Change in Housing Quality no yes yes yes yes
Housing Quality at T-10 no yes yes yes yes
Other variables in Table 1 no yes yes yes╨ yes╨
Observations 21,295 21,282 21,282 20,694 20,694
R-squared 0.65 0.73 0.73 0.74 0.74
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The table shows regressions where the change in the log of average housing rents between consecutive
decennial censuses by census tract is the left-hand-side variable. The explanatory variable of interest is the
change in the share of the foreign born by tract between consecutive census years. All regressions include
fixed effects for each Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and year combination. The regressions include
observations from all census tracts in major immigrant cities that do not have rental price controls, as
defined in the text, for the 1980-1990, and 1990-2000 periods. The average tract housing quality attributes 
∆Log Rents
TABLE 7
╨ In  equations 2 and 3, we substitute log of income at T-10 by log of housing values at T-10. The 
correlation between these variables is 0.9
Immigrant Density and Rents Within the City∆Share Europe 0.055 - -
(0.049)
∆Share South Asia 0.017 - -
(0.070)
∆Share Cuban -0.045 - -
(0.145)
∆Share Midle East -0.17 - -
(0.161)
∆Share Mexico -0.245 - -
(0.027)***
∆Share Africa -0.289 - -
(0.133)**
∆Share East Asia -0.322 - -
(0.054)***
∆Share China -0.36 - -
(0.073)***
∆Share South America -0.418 - -
(0.075)***
∆Share Caribbean -0.55 - -
(0.056)***
∆Share Central America -0.554 - -
(0.075)***
∆Share Dominican -0.843 - -
(0.173)***
∆Share Philippines -0.857 - -
(0.096)***
∆(Foreign Born/Population) - -0.233
(0.020)***
Dropout Immigrant Shock - - -0.377
(0.163)**
Non-Hispanic White Immigrant Shock - - 0.267
(0.061)***
Black Immigrant Shock - - -0.494
(0.066)***
Asian Immigrant Shock - - -0.183
(0.048)***
Hispanic Immigrant Shock - - -0.042
(0.102)
Schol District -Year Fixed Effects no yes yes
MSA-Year Fixed Effects yes no no
∆in Housing Quality yes yes yes
Housing Quality at T-10 yes yes yes
Other variables in Table 1 yes yes yes
Observations 18,178 18,167 18,167




The table shows regressions where the change in the log of average housing prices
between consecutive decennial censuses by census tract is the left-hand-side
variable. The explanatory variables of interest are the change in the share of the
foreign born by nationality and tract between consecutive census years (column 1). In
column 2 we reproduce the results in Table 1 controlling for school district fixed
effects. In column 3 we use differences in average education and ethnicity by national
group and State to proxy for the "shocks" on these variables by census tract that are
associated with immigration. The regressions include observations from all census
tracts in major immigrant cities, as defined in the text, for the 1990-2000 period. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∆Log ValueVariable Mean Variable Mean Variable Mean
(S.D.) (S.D.) (S.D.)
Change in log value 0.478 Change share single attached units 0.020 Share single detached units at T-10 0.623
(0.421) (0.051) (0.268)
Change in (Foreign Born/Population)  0.052 Change share housing units in 2 unit buildings -0.006 Share single attached units at T-10 0.055
(0.072) (0.027) (0.088)
Change share units with no bedrooms 0.008 Change share housing units in 3-4 unit  0.002 Share housing units in 2 unit buildings at T-10 0.048
(0.023)   buildings (0.031) (0.092)
Change share units with 1 bedroom 0.003 Share units with no bedrooms at T-10 0.020 Share housing units in 3-4 unit buildings  0.045
(0.057) (0.037)   at T-10 (0.061)
Change share units with 2 bedrooms -0.015 Share units with 1 bedroom at T-10 0.148 Share with bachelor's degree at T-10 0.208
(0.072) (0.124) (0.143)
Change share units with 3 bedrooms -0.006 Share units with 2 bedrooms at T-10 0.299 Share high school drop outs at T-10 0.269
(0.074) (0.146) (0.161)
Change share units with 4 bedrooms 0.004 Share units with 3 bedrooms at T-10 0.369 Log family income at T-10 10.156
(0.052) (0.157) (0.348)
Change share units with electric heating 0.057 Share units with 4 bedrooms at T-10 0.138 Share white at T-10 0.815
(0.098) (0.123) (0.228)
Change share units with oil heating -0.029 Share units with electric heating at T-10 0.227 Share 25 or younger at T-10 0.388
(0.070) (0.246) (0.093)
Change share units with gas heating -0.025 Share units with oil heating at T-10 0.089 Share 65 or older at T-10 0.112
(0.105) (0.194) (0.099)
Change share units with complete plumbing 0.005 Share units with gas heating at T-10 0.630 Share households family + kids at T-10 0.364
(0.015) (0.312) (0.150)
Change share units with complete kitchen 0.006 Share units with complete plumbing at T-10 0.990 Ownership rate at T-10 (households) 0.672
  facilities (0.017) (0.020) (0.208)
Change share units built 10 years ago or less -0.116 Share units with complete kitchen facilities  0.987 Vacancy rate at T-10 0.063
(0.208)   at T-10 (0.020) (0.064)
Change share units built 20 years ago or less -0.021 Share units built 10 years ago or less at T-10 0.308 Log density at T-10 7.092
(0.233) (0.276) (1.570)
Change share units built 30 years ago or less -0.011 Share units built 20 years ago or less at T-10 0.244
(0.220) (0.166)
Change share single detached units -0.025 Share units built 30 years ago or less at T-10 0.210
(0.100) (0.172)
Appendix TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics(1) (2) (4) (5)
Estimated Immigrant Gravity Pull 3.349 1.909 1.85 2.699
(0.384)*** (0.343)*** (0.393)*** (0.993)***
Foreign Population at T-10/Population at T-10 0.007 0.292
(0.009) (0.010)***
Estimated Immigrant Gravity Pull  Share Foreign Born at T-10 -17.243
(0.735)***
Gravity Pull • (MSA Immigrants/Initial Population) 31.877
(4.373)***
MSA-Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes
Other Variables in Table 1, Column 2 no yes yes yes
Observations 35,134 35,120 35,120 35,120
R-squared 0.12 0.27 0.27 0.32
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Change in (Foreign Born/Population)
Appendix TABLE 2
2SLS: First Stage
The table shows the first-stage regressions of the 2SLS approach in Table 4. The instrumented variable of
interest is the change in the share of the foreign born by tract between consecutive census years. The
instruments are the immigrant "gravity pull" (as described in Table 4 and the text) and interactions of the latter
variable with initial levels of immigrant density in the tract and the level of immigration in the last decade by
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) relative to the initial MSA population. All regressions include fixed effects for
each MSA and year combination. The regressions include observations from all census tracts in major
immigrant cities, as defined in the text, for the 1980-1990, and 1990-2000 periods. (1) (2)
Change in (Foreign Born/Population) -0.324 -0.163
(0.098)*** (.046)**
Share Foreign-Born at T-10 -0.031
(0.012)***
Other variables in Table 1, Column 2 yes yes
MSA-Year Fixed Effects yes yes
Instruments ∆Gravity Pull
(Share Foreign-Born at 
T-10)
2, Share Foreign-
Born at T-10 • 
Immigrants per Capita in 
MSA
F-test of excluded variables 5.56 819.44
N 34,833 34,833
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Change in Log Average Value
Alternative Instrument: Changes in Pull, and 
Nonlinearities in Lagged Density 
Appendix TABLE 3
The table shows regressions where the change in the log of average housing prices between
consecutive decennial censuses by census tract is the left-hand-side variable. The explanatory variable
of interest is the change in the share of the foreign born by tract between consecutive census years.
This variable is instrumented with the change in immigrant "gravity pull" variable (column 1), as defined
in Table 3. In column 2 the instruments are the interaction between a quadratic in lagged immigrant
shares, and the number of immigrants in the MSA divided by lagged MSA population. All regressions
include fixed effects for each MSA and year combination. The regressions include observations from all










Africa 7.18 45.95 68.83
South Central Asia 10.57 60.70 94.32
Philippines 12.08 44.68 96.43
Middle East 13.70 43.05 11.68
South America 18.77 23.01 88.54
Caribbean 21.09 15.87 97.04
China 21.54 44.99 97.91
East Asia 21.73 28.33 94.23
Europe 22.33 24.96 7.69
Other 31.56 22.92 56.79
Cuba 33.39 17.51 98.37
Dominican Republic 45.56 8.98 99.01
Central America 46.31 9.32 96.34
Mexico 65.46 4.20 99.18
Appendix TABLE 4
Main SES Characteristics by World Region